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Group Taxation, Asymmetric Taxation and Cross-Border Investment Incentives in Austria 1 Introduction
In most countries, companies limited by shares and limited liability companies are subject to corporate income tax. Whereas corporate groups have to deliver consolidated financial statements for financial accounting purposes, they are not allowed to file consolidated tax statements. Instead, the parent company and its subsidiaries are taxed separately. Separate taxation ignores the fact that a corporate group constitutes an economic unit. As a consequence, many countries relaxed separate taxation for corporate groups and introduced group taxation regimes 1 . Group taxation regimes create tax integration by assigning all profits and losses within the corporate group to the parent company. Thus, group taxation provides an intra-group lossoffset.
In 2005, Austrian group taxation was modified substantially. Until 2004, group taxation could only be established between domestic corporations, while foreign subsidiaries were excluded from Austrian tax groups. Now, foreign subsidiaries can be integrated as well. By allowing for cross-border loss-offset, the tax legislator intended to improve Austria's attractiveness as a location for holding companies 2 . This policy was mainly triggered by tax competition from the new Eastern European EU member states. Moreover, the tax reform anticipates EU antidiscrimination rules. The European Court of Justice is expected to declare group taxation regimes which exclude foreign subsidiaries unlawful 3 . As a consequence, all member states would have to adapt their group taxation regimes. We therefore analyse from an economic perspective whether the Austrian tax reform can serve as a model for future European group taxation.
The Austrian tax literature widely appreciated the new group taxation 4 . However, its investment incentives are still unknown. In particular, the interaction of group taxation and asymmetric taxation of profits and losses remains to be analysed. The investment effects of group taxation are characterised by their relative impact on the different investment alternatives. We look at a two-stage corporate group. The parent company is located in Austria, while the subsidiary is based in another EU member state. In our investment model, the alternatives are real versus financial investment, both of which can be carried out either domestically by the parent company or in the foreign country by the subsidiary. If foreign real or financial investment is chosen, the investor decides whether or not to opt for group taxation.
This paper addresses the following questions:
• Does Austrian group taxation favour either domestic or foreign activities?
• Does Austrian group taxation favour either real or financial investment?
Our results will indicate whether group taxation actually improves Austria's attractiveness for setting up holding companies or whether unintended investment incentives prevail. The issue is relevant from an individual as well as a fiscal perspective. On the one hand, investors are given support for their individual investment decisions. On the other hand, tax authorities gain an insight into the effects of group taxation regimes, which can be used for improved predictions of tax revenue and better control of fiscal policy. As investment decisions are essentially multiperiod decisions, we will use an individual dynamic investment model to evaluate Austrian group taxation. In order to analyse the combined effects of group taxation and loss-offset restrictions under uncertainty, we perform Monte Carlo simulations.
Literature
The existing literature on Austrian group taxation is mainly written from a tax law perspective 5 .
It merely focuses on practical problems like the preconditions for group membership, minimum share requirements, or the choice of the optimal fiscal year. Only a few analytical papers on the investment incentives of group taxation have been published until now 6 . In contrast, the international literature on asymmetric taxation has an economic perspective and emphasises investment effects 7 .
Optimal repatriation and financing strategies of multinational corporations and the optimal legal 5 Cf. Bartl (2004) In this paper, we try to eliminate this shortcoming by simultaneously analysing the investment incentives of the new Austrian group taxation and loss-offset limitations.
Model design

Investment model
At time 0 = t , an investor with a finite time horizon of n periods decides to invest equity capital 0 I . The investor either acquires a real investment project with cash flows ) , , 1 ( n t CF t … = or a financial investment with the constant pre-tax interest rate i . In the case of negative cash flows the investor can borrow at the same rate i .
The investor (parent company) is an Austrian corporation. It can either invest in the domestic market for its own account or establish a 100% subsidiary that invests in the foreign country. The choices of location and legal structure at time 0 = t are irreversible and cannot be revised during the planning period.
By optimally choosing its activities at time 0 = t , the parent company maximises its future value at time n t = . The parent company does not pay dividends during the time interval [ [ n ; 0 . Profits are fully retained. Thus, all cash flows from real or financial investments are re-invested at the interest rate i until the time horizon n is reached.
In principle, a neutral system of business taxation has to take all taxes on all levels into account 11 . A complete tax model of a corporate group therefore includes the parent company's taxes, the taxes of all levels of subsidiaries, and taxes of the parent company's shareholders. For reasons of complexity, the parent company's shareholders will be neglected in our model. In a multi-period setting, the optimisation of repatriation policy under asymmetric taxation typically involves non-linear mixed-integer optimisation problems. These problems are notoriously hard to solve, even if group taxation regimes are neglected. To justify our method of procedure, we assume that the investment alternative which yields the maximum future value on the corporate level corresponds to that with the maximum future value on the shareholders' individual level.
Tax assumptions
Our model focuses on the investment effects of group taxation regimes and loss-offset restrictions. We therefore assume that the tax base is defined similarly in both countries. To isolate the effects of group taxation under limited loss-offset, we assume identical rules for depreciation allowances t δ in both countries. In accordance with Austrian tax law, linear 11 Cf. Scholes et al. (2005) . 12 Depreciation allowances on the subsidiary's book value are neglected because these items are non-deductible under the exemption method in both the domestic and cross-border case. 13 For corporations, the withholding tax on interest income (Kapitalertragsteuer) is not a final tax. There are no tax allowances. 14 Cf. § 9 (6) no. 1 KStG (Austrian corporate income tax code). 
is a binary variable that indicates whether group taxation is applied ( 1
. In our model, the option for group taxation is assumed irreversible 17 .
If the foreign subsidiary incurs losses, the foreign country typically grants a tax loss carryforward. The subsidiary's loss carry-forwards can be set off against its own future profits (loss deduction). Under group taxation, the parent company has to make up for the subsidiary's loss deduction in order to prevent a double loss-offset. sum of earnings can be computed as:
Since 2001, Austrian tax law has restricted loss deductions. The use of loss carry-forwards is limited to 75% of the current sum of earnings 22 . This provision implies a minimum tax base 23 of at least % 25 = α of positive profits, regardless of existing loss carry-forwards. A time limit for loss carry-forwards does not exist 24 . As a result, the tax base t TB is defined as the maximum of the sum of earnings minus loss carry-forward at the beginning of the period, and the minimum taxable fraction of profits. If the sum of earnings is negative, the tax base equals zero:
Here, t LC denotes the loss carry-forward at the end of period t .
We assume that the foreign country does not apply a minimum tax. With the foreign corporate tax rate S τ being proportional, the subsidiary's tax payment S t T is:
. According to EU law, withholding taxes (Kapitalertragsteuer) neither exist on dividends nor on liquidation proceeds 25 . Hence, the parent company's tax payment T t P amounts to: Losses from liquidations can be deducted as far as they exceed tax-free dividends received in the previous 5 years ( § 10 (3) KStG). 22 Cf. § 27 (2) KStG in connection with § 2 (2b) EStG. 23 This type of minimum tax should not be confused with the U.S. alternative minimum tax, which is a parallel tax system with its own tax base and tax rate. 24 Until 1990, Austria applied a time limit on loss carry-forwards of 7 years. 25 Art. 5 (1) P-S-D. We neglect the special treatment of distributions following a liquidation, which are explicitly exempted from P-S-D (article 4 (1) P-S-D). We assume that the home state of the subsidiary does not levy a withholding tax on liquidation proceeds.
Measuring tax effects
As stated above, the parent company maximises its future value at the time horizon n t = .
Consequently, the investment effects of the group taxation and loss-offset limitations are quantified by differences in future values. The future value of an investment alternative is given by the final account balance n FI , which is calculated on the basis of a cash flow statement:
. ) 1 ( there is no loss carry-forward. The repatriation policy is determined by the difference in the nominal tax rates: Profits are fully distributed if the foreign corporate tax rate exceeds the domestic one. Otherwise, profits are retained until the time horizon n t = . Technically, the dividend payments are defined as follows:
The subsidiary is liquidated at the time horizon n t = . Then, its account balance S n FI is distributed to the parent company 27 . Liquidating the subsidiary does not induce an additional tax payment in the foreign country because all profits have already been subject to tax.
A remaining loss carry-forward at the time horizon n t = can no longer be set off. For computing the future value, however, it is included by means of a lump-sum valuation. Although the parent 26 In Austria, financial accounting has an authoritative function for tax purposes for most items. 27 The parent company pays for possible debts of the subsidiary. company terminates its economic activities at n t = , other taxpayers might still utilise its loss carry-forward, at least to a limited degree. In our simulations, remaining loss carry-forwards of the parent company and the subsidiary are valued at % 40 = β of face value 28 . This means that the parent company receives a virtual cash receipt of
Computing the parent company's future value requires a separate cash flow statement. The parent company's balance account at time t amounts to:
The future value at the time horizon P n FV is defined as the sum of the balance account and the loss carry-forwards valued on a lump-sum basis:
).
S n
Under Austrian tax law, profits from liquidating a subsidiary are tax-exempt 29 . Liquidation losses are tax-deductible, however, if they exceed the last 5 years' tax-free dividends. Hence, the parent company's total tax payment in the final period n t = is given by: Since nominal tax rates have a decisive impact on international location decisions, we differentiate between high-tax and low-tax foreign countries. In our simulations, the high-tax country levies a nominal tax rate of % 38 = S τ , reflecting the combined corporate and municipal tax rate in Germany. In the low-tax country, the tax rate is % 19 = S τ , which, e.g., applies for Slovakia.
Whether a tax group should be established crucially depends on the level of domestic income. This is especially true for holding companies without domestic operating activities, because filing for foreign losses is pointless without domestic profits. We therefore simulate exogenously-given domestic income t DE at a level of -50,000, 0, and +50,000 p.a.
32 Additional parameters applied in the simulations are: 
Simulation results
Decision between domestic and foreign financial investment
Since interest yield is deterministic and always positive, group taxation regimes do not influence decisions between domestic financial investment in the parent company and foreign financial investment in the subsidiary. Financial investments are always carried out in the lower-tax country.
Decision between domestic and foreign real investment
As expected, the nominal tax rates also determine the decision between domestic real investment in the parent company and foreign real investment in the subsidiary. The impact of group taxation on domestic versus foreign real investment, however, is ambiguous. Whether group taxation or separate taxation is chosen crucially depends on the expected structure of cash flows and the level of domestic income.
We were surprised by the results for expected marginal investment with increasing cash flows, ). This apparently paradoxical effect results from the initial losses that frequently arise in this parameter setting. In principle, these foreign initial losses could be set off against domestic profits, if there had been any. In our case, however, the group taxation only generates a domestic loss carry-forward, which in future periods is subject to the loss deduction limit of 75% of current profits 33 . The parent company therefore has to pay taxes even in the presence of loss carry-forwards.
This effect is not primarily caused by the lump-sum valuation of expiring loss carry-forwards. It also occurs, e.g., for 8 . 0 = β . The average future value decreases from 2,280,462 without group taxation to 2,279,506 with group taxation. A reduction may even occur for the maximal, but unrealistic value of 1 = β . This kind of group taxation paradox could not occur without the lossdeduction limit 34 .
For sufficiently high levels of domestic income, which prevent domestic loss carry-forwards, these paradoxes do not occur. 
CF
, the average increase in future values amounts to less than 0.3%. Group taxation never alters the decision between domestic and foreign real investment in this parameter setting. The negligible magnitude of the investment incentives leads to the conclusion that group taxation regimes may be almost irrelevant to expected infra-marginal projects.
Decision between optimal real investment and optimal financial investment
With regard to the decision between value-maximising real investment and value-maximising financial investment, the effects of group taxation are ambiguous. For expected marginal projects different levels of domestic income.
with constant or decreasing cash flows, the arithmetic mean of the difference of future values increases in all parameter settings. In contrast, the effects are ambiguous for expected increasing cash flows: Group taxation lowers the mean difference of future values for the low-tax foreign country and raises the mean difference of future values for the high-tax foreign country if domestic income is non-positive.
In the case of the low-tax foreign country, the reason for the decrease of the average difference of future values is that foreign profits are tax-exempt and cannot be set off against domestic losses 35 . Domestic loss-offset potential can only be used if domestic investment is carried out or if foreign profits are repatriated. In many cases, domestic loss-offset potential compensates for the higher domestic tax rate (25% instead of 19% abroad). It may therefore pay off to realise investment in the parent company.
In contrast, the average difference in future values can increase substantially, assuming positive exogenous domestic income. This result does not depend on the nominal tax rates.
If the fraction of positive differences in future values is considered, introducing group taxation does not induce significant effects. As a consequence, group taxation seems to offer only marginal incentives for real investments.
As could be expected, group taxation is almost irrelevant to expected infra-marginal projects. It induces changes of the average difference of future values between optimal real and optimal financial investment of between +0.3% and -0.3%.
Relevance of repatriation policy
According to equation (7), we assumed that the subsidiary's distribution policy is exclusively determined by nominal tax rates: Profits are fully distributed if the foreign corporate tax rate exceeds the domestic one. Otherwise, all profits are retained until the time horizon n t = . In a multi-period setting, such a simple decision rule may produce suboptimal future values as soon as exogenous domestic losses coincide with low foreign tax rates. The domestic losses cannot be set off against tax-exempt foreign profits and accumulate to the domestic loss carry-forward.
Since the profit from liquidating the foreign subsidiary is also tax-exempt, the domestic loss 35 If the exogenous domestic income is non-negative, losses do not occur, and domestic and foreign income is taxed separately. Hence, the choice of location follows the lower nominal tax rate.
carry-forward can only be valued at the lump-sum fraction β .
Despite the higher domestic tax rate, it can be efficient to repatriate profits generated by the foreign subsidiary in order to use the domestic loss-offset potential. Although the dividends are tax-exempt, the positive interest income resulting from re-invested dividends can be set off against domestic losses in future periods. For full distribution, the increase of the average future value is 1,416 higher than for full retention. For expected marginal projects with decreasing cash flows , 018 , 399 ( 0 = CF ) 000 , 50 − = µ the increase of the average future value resulting from group taxation is even 22,741 higher than for full retention. As a consequence, improving the dividend policy seems to strengthen the group taxation's effectiveness, as can be seen from In this parameter setting, the domestic loss-offset potential compensates for the domestic tax rate (25%) which is higher than the foreign tax rate (19%). Obviously, there is a trade-off between nominal tax rates and loss-offset potential. Investors are well advised to decide simultaneously upon repatriation policy and the option for group taxation.
Dividend restrictions from financial accounting also affect the group taxation's effectiveness. In general, dividend restrictions in the presence of loss carry-forwards discriminate against real investment in the foreign subsidiary. It is obvious that additional restrictions tend to reduce future values. The average reduction of the future value differs, however, depending on whether group taxation is applied or not. Substantial differences can only be observed for projects with starting losses, because loss carry-forwards exclude dividends. For expected marginal projects with increasing cash flows ) 000 , 100 , 801 , 309 Hence, sensible planning for the establishment of a tax group requires detailed assumptions on the possible activities. Obviously, the group taxation's investment incentives should not be overestimated. The future values of the different investment alternatives vary too slightly to cause substantial shifts in investment behaviour. A promotion of real investment seems unlikely.
The dividend policy should be taken into account when deciding whether or not to opt for group taxation. Even for subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions, immediate repatriation of profits can be efficient to use domestic loss-offset potential. In many cases, there is a trade-off between tax rates and loss-offset rules, which means that improved loss-offset potential can compensate for a higher nominal tax rate.
Innovative projects often generate initial losses. Since the Austrian loss deduction limit tends to cause group taxation paradoxes, it is not yet clear to which extent the taxpayers will opt for the group taxation. Comprehensive tax planning explicitly requires taking exogenous domestic income into account. For holding companies without a domestic operating business, group taxation seems almost irrelevant, because the dividends received by these corporations are tax-exempt in Austria 36 and hence cannot be set off against foreign losses.
Tax planning of projects with starting losses requires an especially thorough analysis. Opting for group taxation may prove harmful in the presence of dividend restrictions from financial accounting. As a consequence, investors are well advised to plan a project's expected rate of return, its expected structure of cash flows, domestic taxable income and the optimal repatriation policy simultaneously prior to establishing a tax group.
In the light of the model's complexity, some real-world problems have been neglected here and should be subject to further analysis. Integration of the parent company's shareholders and their taxation poses one of these problems. Since these shareholders may be domestic or foreign natural persons or corporations, a variety of different cases with different tax consequences may arise.
Apart from the location decision, the parent company can use various other tax minimising strategies that we neglected in our model such as, for example, financing policy. As we assume equity-financed investments, the only possibility to partially avoid the loss deduction limit for the parent company is to pay out dividends. In contrast, if the parent company finances the foreign subsidiary with debt instead of equity, the loss deduction limit can be avoided easily. Table 6 : Relative frequency of optimal choice of the investment project
